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PRODUCT LIABILITY UNDER THE CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT 1999
Naemah Amin:
Product liability law in Malaysia is now entering into
a new era with the recent introduction of the
Consumer Protection Act 1999 (hereinafter referred
to as the Act). Part X of the Act introduces a new
system of liability in respect of loss or damage caused
by defective products similar to the system available
in the United Kingdom and other European countries.
The new law offers the victims of defective products
an additional remedy to existing remedies under the
law of contract and tort of negligence. The purpose
of this piece is to examine a new set of concepts
introduced by the Act such as 'product,' 'producer,'
'defect' and the defences available to the defendant
in order to assess the extent to which the new law
realises its main objective to improve the substantive
position of the victims of defective products.
INTRODUCTION
The Malaysian Parliament has recently passed the Consumer
Protection Act 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) with the aim of
providing better legal protection to consumers. The Act covers most major
areas of consumer protection including product liability which is contained
in Part X of the Act. I Product liability is generally understood as referring
• Assistant Professor, Kulliyyah (Faculty) of Laws, International Islamic University,
Malaysia.
I Other areas of consumer protection covered by the Act are: misleading and deceptive
conduct, false representation and unfair practice, safety of goods and services, guarantees
in respect of supply of goods and services and redress mechanism.
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to the civil liability of a manufacturer or distributor for damage caused by
a defect in the product. Under the existing law the victim of a defective
product has to seek remedy either under the law of contract or tort of
negligence which obviously is inadequate to protect them.'
The Act basically introduces a new system ofliability in respect
of death, personal injury and damage to property caused by defective
products. Such a system is believed to overcome the problems inherent
in contractual and negligence remedies and accordingly gives better
protection to the consumer.' However, as most of the provisions on
product liability are based on Part 1 of the United Kingdom Consumer
Protection Act 1987, the criticisms of the UK Act may equally apply to
the new Act.' This article aims to provide an overview of product liability
law in Malaysia under the Act. All the important provisions of the Act
will be considered in order to provide a fuller appreciation of the scope of
protection offered, its adequacy and its weaknesses.
THE NATURE OF THE LIABILITY
It may be understood that the Act introduces a regime of strict
liability for damage caused by a defective product although the phrase
'strict liability' does not appear in the Act. However section 68 (1) of the
Act makes it clear that 'where any damage is caused wholly or partly by
a defect in a product, the following persons shall be liable for the damage. '5
It can clearly be deduced from this provision that the liability can be
imposed without contractual relationship and without proof of fault. Thus,
to succeed in a product liability claim, the plaintiffhas only to prove damage,
defect in the product and the causal link between the two.
It seems reasonably clear that the central tenet of the liability is
the defect in the product unlike liability in negligence which is based on
the conduct of the producer. The advantage of this approach for the
2 The law of contract confines the remedy to the buyer and restricts the liability to the
seller. A remedy for a non-contracting party under the law of negligence will depend
on his ability to prove the manufacturer's fault. See Daniels and Daniels v R. White &
Sons Ltd. [1938] 4 All ER 258; Priest v Last [1903] 2 KB 148; Evans v Triplex Safety
Glass Co [1936] 1 All ER 283.
3 S.S. Rachagan (ed), Consumer Law Reform: A Report, (University of Malaya Press,
Kuala Lumpur, 1992), para 1.11.1.
• See for e.g. A. Clark, Product Liability, (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1989); Bragate
and Savage, "The Consumer Protection Act 1987," (1987) NLJ 929; J. Blaikie,
"Product Liability: The Consumer Protection Act 1987 Part 1," (1987) JLSS 325.
S Emphasis added. The section then lists down the persons to be held liable. See
discussion infra at 5-9.
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individual is that liability may be imposed by reason of the existence of a
defect alone. However, the onus of proving that the product was defective
still remains with the plaintiff, and this may create great difficulties for
consumers especially in design defect cases. Similarly, proof of causation
will remain a difficulty as in many cases the evidence used in establishing
causation will bear a marked similarity to that adduced by consumers in
the past to establish fault. This is particularly relevant in controversial
areas such as litigation over allegedly defective drugs. In many cases, it
may be difficult for the plaintiff to show that the illness was caused by
the product, rather than by other genetic or environmental factors.
Furthermore, the concept of defectiveness under the Act, which
is based on the vague concept of a consumer expectation test, may
preclude the plaintiffs claim, and it has been subjected to considerable
criticism." In addition, the availability of several defences makes it
reasonably certain that liability under the Act is by no means absolute.
Although the producer of a defective product is generally held to be liable,
he may escape liability by proving one of the defences provided by the
Act.'
On the other hand, it is undeniable that the Act does improve the
position of the victim of a defective product in a number of ways. Most
importantly, the Act provides new protection to the consumer in addition
to the existing protection under the common law." The consumer,
therefore, is in a better position than has hitherto been the case. The Act
also facilitates the plaintiff procedurally by relieving him of the burden of
proving fault. He still needs to prove that the defect caused his injury but
not apparently that the producer caused the defect. Unlike contractual
liability, liability under the Act cannot be limited or excluded by any contract
term, any notice or other provisions." From another angle, the Act clearly
provides a wide range of people who can be easily identified and are
accessible against whom to pursue an action.'?
PRODUCTS
What types of product are covered by the Act? This is one of
6 See section 67. G. Howells, "Europe's Solution to the Product Liability Phenomenon,"
(1990) 20 Anglo-Am LR 204; A. Stoppa, "The Concept of Defectiveness in the
Consumer Protection Act 1987: A Critical Analysis," 12 Legal Studies 210.
7 Section 72.
8 Section 68(7) states, "This section shall be without prejudice to any liability arising
otherwise than under this Part."
9 Section 71.
10 See section 68 of the Act.
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the most important questions to be answered since the scope of the Act
depends upon the meaning given to 'product. ' Despite the wide definition
of 'product' provided by the Act, it certainly does not cover every product.
In certain cases, the definition of product appears to raise some difficulties.
Section 66 defines 'product' as:
"any goods and, subject to sub-section (2), includes
a product which is comprised in another product,
whether by virtue of being a component part or raw
material or otherwise."
In this definition two types of products are clearly covered by
the Act, namely, goods and component parts and raw materials. Section
3 provides;
"'Goods' means goods which are primarily purchased, used or
consumed for personal, domestic or household purposes, and
includes-
(a) goods attached to, or incorporated in, any real or personal
property;
(b) animals, including fish;
(c) vessels and vehicles;
(d) utilities; and
(e) trees, plants and crops whether on, under and attached to
land or not, but does not include choses in action, including
negotiable instruments, shares, debentures and money."
It is reasonably clear that only goods which are purchased
for private and non-commercial purpose are covered by the Act. Thus
most household items such as kitchen utensils, electrical appliances and
toiletries are within the ambit ofthe Act. Goods also include articles fixed
to the land such as air-conditioners, appliances and furniture. Although
vessels and vehicles are included in the definition, injuries caused by major
capital items such as ships and aircraft are not covered by the Act since
they are normally bought for commercial purposes. Whether
pharmaceutical products are included is not clear because the Act
generally does not apply to healthcare services provided by healthcare
professionals or healthcare facilities. 11 It may be argued however, that
pharmaceutical products should be included in the scheme of product
II Section 2(2)(f).
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liability since there is no specific provision in Part X for their exclusion."
On the other hand human blood and organs and intellectual
products such as letters, books, tapes, film and computer software" are
arguably excluded from the definition since they cannot be considered as
'goods' in a strict sense. The embodiment of animals, trees, plant and
crops in the definition of goods seems to be irrelevant since there is no
liability under the Act for agricultural produce, unless it has undergone an
industrial process." Thus, potatoes in a natural state would be exempted,
but not crisps; bananas but not fried-bananas; fresh meat, fish and chicken
but not frozen meat, fish and chicken. This kind of exemption inevitably
creates some anomalies. Taking into consideration the modem method of
farming such as the use of fertilisers, pesticides, steroids, artificial
insemination etc, this exemption may be difficult to be justified.
Component parts and raw materials which are comprised in other
products are within the ambit of the Act. Thus, if a defective brake-
cylinder or windscreen is installed in a car, the producer of these component
parts will be liable under the Act if it caused injury. However, the
manufacturers of a component may escape liability if they can show that
the defect was not attributable to them but was wholly attributable to the
producer of the subsequent product. I5 In this respect, a product will also
certainly include the materials used to construct a building. Thus, the
producer ofthe bricks, cement, plasterboard and plumbing would be held
liable under the Act if they prove to be defective. However, the Act does
not apply to any materials incorporated in the building which is disposed
of by the creation of interest in land." Thus, a person who buys a finished
house, which is defective, has to seek remedy under other laws possibly
in negligence.
12 The exclusion of health care goods is clearly stated in section 19(6) for the purpose of
Part III of the Act. Furthermore, taking into account that a drug-related tragedy
initially provoked debate on the reform of product liability law in the USA and
Europe, it would be very unreasonable if this product is to be exempted.
13 It is reasonably clear, however, that a distinction should be drawn between the
intellectual contents of a physical product and the physical product itself. A product,
like a book in its physical nature is undoubtedly within the definition of 'product'. See
S. Whittaker, "European Product Liability and Intellectual Products," (1989) 105
LQR 125; J. Stapleton, "Software, Information and the Concept of Product," (1989)
Tel Aviv University Studies in Law 147; S.Singleton, "Product Liability and Computer
Software," (1992) PLI 114.
14 Section 68(5). Section 66( I) defines agricultural produce as any produce ofthe soil, of
stock farming or offisheries.
IS Section 72(I)(e).
16 Section 2(2)(d) states that the Act shall not apply in relation to land or interests in
land.
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WHO IS LIABLE?
The Act does not make every person connected with the product
liable. The persons liable under the Act can be divided into two categories,
namely the primary defendant and secondary defendant. The primary
responsibility for damage caused by a defective product is placed on the
primary defendant, in particular the 'producer' . The secondary defendant
will only be liable in certain circumstances and that liability may be
channelled back to the primary defendant. Section 68 (1) lists three
principal persons who may be strictly liable under the Act;
(a) the producer of the product;
(b) own-brander;
(c) Importer.
The Act makes it clear that the liability is primarily placed on the
producer of the product. Section 66 (1) of the Act states;
"'producer', in relation to a product, means-
(a) the person who manufactured it;
(b) in the case of a substance which has not been
manufactured, won or abstracted, the person who won or
abstracted it;
(c) in the case of a product which has not been manufactured,
won or abstracted but essential characteristics of which
are attributable to an industrial or other process been carried
out the person who carried out that process."
The definition of 'producer' is apparently wide enough to cover
every person involved in the manufacturing process, pre-manufacturing
activity and the processing of a natural product. 'Manufacturer' of a
component part will be jointly or severally liable under the Act. 17 Hence,
a person injured in an accident caused by a defective brake cylinder on a
car may sue either the manufacturer of the brake or the manufacturer of
the car or both of them.
Nonetheless, some confusion is cast on this point by section 66
(2) of the Act which provides that "a person who supplies any product in
which products are comprised, whether by virtue of being component
parts or raw materials or otherwise, shall not be treated by reason only of
his supply of that product as supplying any of the products so comprised."
It seems to suggest that a manufacturer of a finished product exculpates
17 See section 68(6).
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liability for defects attributable to a component part. It is submitted however,
that the provision is meant to protect the supplier of a product rather than
to limit the liability of the manufacturers. Thus, if an accident occurred
due to a defective brake on a car, the dealer of the car is only under
obligation to identify the manufacturer or supplier of the car. He cannot
be held liable ifhe fails to identify the manufacturer of the brakes.
The manufacturer of a finished product clearly includes someone
who purely assembles components made by others, for example by mixing
ingredients, or fixing a unit supplied in kit form. 18 The assembler will be
liable even though the defect in the component was the sole cause ofthe
damage. On the other hand, there are other people who are directly
connected with the product not covered by the Act. These include the
designer and supplier of services such as installers, repairers, dry-cleaners
etc. The designer, although involved in initial manufacturing process, can
by no means be regarded as a manufacturer of the product. Similarly, the
supplier of services merely supplies a service in relation to other people's
products. 19
The second paragraph of the definition of 'producer' covers
those who mine or collect raw materials or other products Of substance
such as coal, gas, oil, ore or clay. It could also be extended to the extraction
of sand, gravel and even of sea-salt from sea-water. The process of
abstraction makes such a person a producer. Thus, for example, a mining
company could be held liable if it supplies contaminated ore. Paragraph
(c) extends the definition of 'producer' to include a person who carried
out an industrial or other process which gave the product its essential
characteristics. The difficulty may arise from the fact that the words
'industrial or other process' and 'essential characteristic' are undefined
and inevitably their meaning will be open to interpretation in each case.
Nevertheless, it can safely be said that the subsection covers such
processes as refining oil or petrol, smelting ore, mixing cement and the
most important, processing of food. Thus, a restaurant that cooks a meal
that caused food poisoning will surely be liable under Part X of the Act.
Certainly, many difficulties in this provision arise when it is applied
to food processors because primary agricultural produce is exempted.
However, once the produce has undergone an industrial process, it
becomes the liability of the processor including the defect which already
existed prior to processing. Thus, if a fruit crop is sprayed with a harmful
pesticide, and the fruit then canned, the canner is liable as an industrial
processor, rather than grower of that fruit. The rationale is that those
18 Wright. Product Liability: The Law and its Implication for Risk Management.
(Blackstone Press Limited. London, 1989). at 40.
19 However. he rnay be subject to the liability of supplier under section 68(2).
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involved in processing should be expected to conduct the appropriate
tests to ensure that hidden defects, howsoever caused, are detected.
Section 68( l)(b) applies liability to any person who, by putting
his name on the product or using a trade mark or other distinguishing
mark in relation to the product, has held himself out to be the producer of
the product. This is perhaps one of the most significant extensions of
liability under the Act. The provision is mainly intended to catch chain
department stores and supermarkets that are generally economically
powerful. 'Own branding' implies a greater acceptance by the retailer of
responsibility for the goods. This is particularly relevant in relation to a
product which is specially manufactured according to own-brander
specification. An own-brander in this category has full control at least in
choosing a reputable supplier.
Thus the imposition of strict liability on them is clearly justified,
not only on the ground that they represent themselves as producer, but
also on the ground that they normally have control over the quality and
safety of the product. However, it remains open to argument whether
liability can be imposed on an own-brander when there is a clear indication
on the product that he is not the manufacturer. It is a well-known practice
that most own-branded products have some indication, often in very small
print, that someone else is the manufacturer. For example, although the
product marks with a logo of X supermarket, the phrases 'specially made
for X supermarket' or, 'packed for X supermarket by y Ltd' also appear
on the product. The phrase 'held himself out to be the producer' in the
section provides no clear answer to this problem. It has been argued that
the liability may depend on how the branding is perceived by the reasonable
consumer. 20
Another significant extension of liability under the Act is the
inclusion of importers. By section 68(1)(c) liability attaches to any person
who has, in the course of his business, imported the product into Malaysia
in order to supply it to another person. The provision is apparently intended
to overcome the practical problem of suing the foreign producer in his
own country.
The liability of the supplier under the Act is secondary in the
sense that he is liable only when he fails to inform the injured person,
within a reasonable time, of the identity of the producer, own-brander or
importer or ofthe person who supplied him with the product. 21 The term
'supplier' is defined in section 3(1) ofthe Act to mean "a person who, in
trade supplies goods to a consumer by transferring the ownership or the
20 Wright, supra, n. 18, at 42.
21 Section 68(4).
-
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possession of the goods under the contract of sale, exchange, lease, hire
or hire-purchase to which that person is a party." This provision can be
considered as a 'blanket proviso' which is intended to ensure that the
victim of a defective product always has an identifiable target or a means
of finding the identity of the producer. This is particularly important in the
case of an anonymous product, especially in relation to bulk-produced
items such as nuts and bolts. Thus, the immediate effect of this provision
appears to cause distributors and retailers to maintain full records oftheir
sources. On the one hand it seems reasonable to impose only secondary
liability on the supplier since the supplier continues to be strictly liable to
the buyer under the Sale of Goods Act, 1957.
On the other hand, this provision may sometimes cause difficulties
to the injured party. The supplier can discharge his liability simply by
identifying his supplier. Ifhis supplier is not the producer, own-brander or
importer, the plaintiff has to make further inquiries until he can find the
potential defendant. The case may be even worse if the person identified
as a supplier is bankrupt or otherwise unable to satisfy any judgement.
As a result, the injured party may be left uncompensated. Further, a
supplier may also escape liability if the request to identify was not made
within a reasonable period after the damage occured. However, what is
a 'reasonable period' is a matter to be decided by the court in regards to
all the circumstances.
MEANING OF DEFECT
As opposed to liability in negligence which is concerned with the
conduct of the manufacturer, liability under the Act focuses on the condition
of the product. However, the product must be proved to be defective
before liability can be imposed on the defendant. Thus, defectiveness
becomes the key concept of the new product liability regime. However,
what constitutes a defect? By what criteria is defectiveness to be judged?
These are not simple questions. Clark notes that 'the problem of defining
defectiveness has exercised the minds of legal scholars perhaps more
than any other aspect of product liability law. '22 Nonetheless, the mean ing
of defect is stated in section 67(1) of the Act:
"Subject to subsections (2) and (3), there is a defect in a
product for the purposes of this Part if the safety of the
product is not such as a person is generally entitled to
expect."
22 A. Clark, supra, n. 4 at 25.
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It is reasonably clear that the definition of "defect" in the Act is
based on the concept of safety." Hence, the Act has no application to
safe but shoddy products. Nonetheless, safety is rather a relative concept.
Inevitably there will often be scope for debate over questions of fact,
degree and standard in deciding whether or not a particular product was
unsafe and therefore defective. It is even more problematic when safety
is to be judged according to what 'a person is generally entitled to expect.'
At first sight, the test appears to be subjective since it is based on
a particular person's expectation. Thus, the individual consumer's personal
knowledge, experience or lack of the same and sensitivity, ought to intrude
into the question of defect. However it is the general expectation that will
be taken into account and not on actual expectation. Can a car be
considered defective when a warning buzzer, which is supposed to indicate
that seat belts were unfastened, fails to operate and results in serious
injury? The ordinary person ought to be aware of the danger of not wearing
a seat belt. Arguably a person is generally entitled to expect that the
product has been designed and manufactured as safely as possible and
he should be properly warned of any possible danger. Therefore,
ascertaining what a person is generally entitled to expect may prove to
be a vague test.
The Act clearly adopts the consumer expectation test in
determining defectiveness. However, it has been argued that, in many
cases, the consumer expectation test will be unable to stand on its own
and will necessarily fall back on a risk-utility analysis." It has been further
argued that 'the actual language ofthe consumer expectation test is simply
a semantic veneer covering what is in reality a cost-benefit test. '25 This
is particularly relevant in a case involving a high risk product such as
drugs. Many drugs are generally known to carry side-effects. Thus, it
seems very unreasonable for a person to be generally entitled to expect
such drugs to be safe. In such a case the court will have to consider the
overall social costs created by the product balanced against the social
benefits conferred by the use of the product. However, this balancing
process may sometimes produce anomalies and result in injustice to an
injured party."
23 Section 67(4) states that safety in relation to a product shall include - (a) safety with
respect to products comprised therein; (b) safety in the context of risk of damage to
property; and (c) safety in the context of risk of death or personal injury.
24 A. Stoppa, supra, n. 6, at 215-217.
25 A. Clark, supra, n. 4, at 37.
26 Thalidomide, for instance, which only carries a risk of harmful side-effect to a small
percentage of persons might not be treated as defective since its purpose is to relieve
the prolonged agony of diseases like cancer and leprosy.
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The consumer expectation test has also been criticised for its
failure to protect the consumer adequately in a case of patent danger."
Many products by their nature are dangerous, for instance knives and
dynamite. Applying the consumer expectation test to such a case is likely
to exempt its producer from liability. Such products cannot be defective
since the consumer could not have expected them to be safe. The test
also means that proper warnings will often be sufficient to exculpate
producers from liability. Nonetheless for the purpose of determining what
'a person is generally entitled to expect,' section 67(2) lays down
guidelines and states that "all relevant circumstances shall be taken into
account," including:
(a) the manner in which, and purposes for which, the
product has been marketed;
(b) the get-up of the product;
(c) the use of any mark in relation to the product;
(d) instructions for or warnings with respect to doing or
refraining from doing anything with or in relation to
the product;
(e) what might reasonably be expected to be done with
or in relation to the product; and
(e) the time when the product was supplied by its producer
to another.
These guidelines apparently confirm that the standard of safety
under the Act is to be judged according to objective criteria applied to the
circumstances of each individual case. In deciding what a person is
generally entitled to expect, the court has to have regard to the
circumstances in which the product is marketed. Undoubtedly, the manner
in which the product is marketed has an immediate impact on the public's
expectation. These include advertising, packaging and labelling. The
inclusion of 'get-up' seems to be irrelevant since it refers to the general
presentation and packaging which, it may be argued is part of the marketing
process. The reference to 'the use of any mark' would obviously include
such things as the use of the SIRIM mark.
The subsection also permits regard to be given to the existence
and adequacy of any warning. In one sense, the consideration of adequate
warnings is identical in cases of negligence. Presumably the court will
27 A. Stoppa, supra, at 6, p 2 \0; 1. Stapleton, "Product Liability Reform - Real or
Illusory",' (1986) 6 OILS 392; G. Howells, Comparative Product Liability, (Dartmouth
Publishing Co., Aldershot, 1993), at 11.
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use the same method as in negligence in deciding' failure to warn' cases
under the Act. For example, in deciding how much information a
manufacturer should provide, the court may resort to the negligence
concept of reasonableness. On the other hand it may be argued that
since the Act is hot intended to create absolute liability, a person cannot
expect that the manufacturer will warn him of every conceivable danger.
It has been argued that the definitions of' defective' are capable of being
construed in a way which is prejudicial to the consumer where a warning
has been given." This is particularly relevant in a case involving a child,
idiot, an illiterate person or a person who does not understand the language
in which the instructions or warnings are written. Thus, a more valid
view seems to be that in deciding the issue of defectiveness the court
should focus attention on the product itself rather than on any warning
given."
The manufacturer's expectation about the use or misuse of the
product is also relevant in deciding defectiveness. This factor is closely
related to the issue of adequate instructions and warnings accompanying
the product. It is highly possible that a product used for a wholly unexpected
purpose will not be found defective merely because it proves to be unsafe
for that purpose, for example, where a screw-driver is used as a chisel or
microwave oven is used to dry a cat. It has been noted that the Act uses
the expression "reasonably be expected" which seems to be a narrower
concept than "reasonable foreseeability.'?" Thus, a manufacturer may
argue that he might foresee that a warning would be disregarded, but that
he did not expect it to be disregarded. As a result the consumer can only
expect the product will be safe as long as he does not misuse the product.
It is anticipated that consumer expectations of a product may
change as technology and standards change. Thus the time of supply is
relevant in deciding defectiveness, with the result that accepted safety
standards at the time the product is put into circulation ought to be taken
into account. This subsection allows factors such as wear and tear to be
considered. Account must also be taken of natural deterioration in the
case of perishable goods such as food. However, the main point to note is
that the relevant time is the time of supply by the producer and not the
subsequent time of supply to the ultimate consumer.
This is further emphasised by section 67(3) which states that
"nothing in this section shall require a defect to be inferred from the mere
fact that the safety of a product which is subsequently supplied is greater
1I A. Clark, "Strict Liability for Product Defect: The 'Failure to Warn' Issue," (1983)
JBL 130.
It /bid.
30 Savage and Bradgate, supra, n. 4, at 956.
-
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than the safety of the product in question." Thus, the standard of safety
of a car produced in 1980 cannot be judged according to the standard
exhibited in the latest model. Without this provision, producers would
constantly have to recall and modify older products every time they
introduced a safety improvement.
RECOVERABLE DAMAGES
Defective products may cause various types of loss and damage,
ranging from the trivial to the catastrophic, and it is the main aim of
product liability law to compensate those losses. Damage is defined in
section 66(1) of the Act as meaning' death or personal injury, or any loss
of or damage to any property, including land, as the case may require.'
Obviously, death and personal injury are the most important risks of a
defective product. Thus law should treat death and personal injury more
seriously than any other losses due to the nature of the injury and its fatal
consequences. Recoverability of such losses has long been established
under the existing law which is unaffected by the Act and unlikely to
create a difficult problem."
Many doubts and uncertainties appear to be raised from the issues
of recovery of damage to property and in particular economic loss
consequential upon such damage. It reasonably clear however that
damages under the Act covers 'any loss of or damage to any property
including land.' This would clearly include any physical damage to or
destruction of moveable or immovable property and any loss of them.
Thus, presumably the owner of expensive missingjewellery or valuable
documents may claim damages against the producer of a defective carrier
bag or briefcase. Similar action might be brought against the manufacturer
of a defective burglar alarm which failed to operate and caused the theft
of household contents." The inclusion of damage to land would cover,
for example, damage to soil by a defective weedkiller or fertiliser."
However, a claim for damage to property other than the defective
31 See the Civil Law Act 1956 and section 70 of the Act. Generally the recovery of
compensation for loss and damage under the Act wiJI be governed by the general rules
governing the recovery of damages in tort. It should be noted, however, that the
problems of causation arising in negligence with regard to foreseeability of the type of
damage, or manner of its infliction, or whether it was within the foreseeable risk, may
not be so relevant under the Act because the Act only requires proof that damage was
wholly or partly caused by a defective product.
32 Notably, however, the difficult issue of causation which may be raised from such a
claim.
II Blaikie, supra, n. 4, at 329.
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product itself is restricted by section 69(1)( c) which states;
"Where any damage is caused wholly or partly by a
defect in a product, the liability of the person liable for
the damage under section 68 shall not include the loss of
or damage to - any property which at the time it is lost or
damaged is not
(i) of a description of property ordinarily intended for
private use, occupation or consumption; and
(ii) intended by the person suffering the loss or damage
mainly for his own private use, occupation or
consumption. "
Hence, if a defective electrical appliance damages a private
house, the loss would be recoverable, but not if it burns down a factory.
Similarly damage caused to a private car by a defective accessory or
replacement part can be claimed but if the same part damaged a company
car, it is irrecoverable under the Act. It is reasonably clear that the Act
draws a distinction between damage to private property and damage to
commercial property and there are obviously strong reasons for excluding
damage to the latter. First, business organisations can be expected to
insure against damage to their property and spread the cost of the insurance
to their consumers, whereas individuals might not hold or be able to afford
extensive cover. Second, damage to commercial property such as a factory
and machinery can be very extensive and such a claim would be very
onerous for the producer. Further, the Act, as its name implies, is designed
to protect' consumers' and in the context of the Act this means private
consumer. 34
However, although the distinction between private property and
business property may be attractive in theory, it may not be so easy to
apply in practice. In view of this, it is conceivable that certain products
can be both ordinarily intended for private use and for commercial use,
for example a personal computer and a car. In determining whether a
particular property is private property, the Act requires that at the time of
damage the property must fulfill two conditions. First, the property must
be 'ordinarily intended for private use, occupation or consumption.' Thus,
if damage is caused to a heavy goods vehicle belonging to an enthusiast
as part of a private collection, it cannot be recovered because that would
be a type of property not ordinarily intended for private use."
14 See the definition of consumer in section 3( 1).
31 Wright, supra, n. 18, at 54.
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Secondly, the property must be "intended by the person suffering
the loss or damage mainly for his own private use, occupation or
consumption." Therefore, if a personal computer which was originally
bought for private use but later is used for business purposes and
subsequently damaged by the insertion of a defective disk, such damage
is not recoverable under the Act because the question of whether the
property is private or business property will be judged 'at the time it is lost
or damaged. '
Although the Act clearly refers to a plaintiffs private use and
occupation, arguably it should also include use and occupation by his
family. However, it remains to be seen whether it extends to other relatives.
Will it apply to a private house which is used for charitable purposes for
instance, as a home for the elderly? Can the owner claim damages if the
house is burned down due to a defective air-conditioner? No doubt it
might be argued that the answer lies in the word 'mainly', and the property
must mainly be used' for personal purposes. Thus, such damage, albeit to
private property, may not be recoverable under the Act.
Section 69( 1) also provides;
"Where any damage is caused wholly or partly by a
defect in a product, the liability of the person liable for
the damage under section 68 shall not include the loss of
or damage to -
(a) the defective product;
(b) the whole or any part of any product which
comprises the defective product."
It is perfectly clear that the Act does not cover damage to the
defective product itself which may give rise to two situations. First, a
mere defect in quality which renders the product useless or valueless, for
example, a toy which easily breaks without any apparent reason or a
new television set which has no sound." This kind ofloss is considered
as mere loss of bargain or expectation as a result of buying a product
which may be safe but shoddy. This category is undeniably within the
province of sale of goods law and thus it should continue to be governed
by it.37
Second, the defective product itself is damaged due to a defect
36 Damage to the defective product itse\fis generally categorised as purely economic loss
and irrecoverable in the law of negligence. See Murphy v Brentwood District Council
[1991] I AC 398; D&F Estates v Church Commissioners [1988] 2 All ER 992;
Department of the Environment v Thomas Bates & Son [1990] 2 All ER 943.
37 See the Sale of Goods Act 1957 and Part VI & VII of the Act.
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in its component parts, for example, a defective tyre which bursts and
damages the car. This kind of damage also is irrecoverable under the Act
if, arguably, a component part had been originally comprised in the product.
However, damage to the car may be recovered if the tyre was a
replacement because it had not been 'comprised in the car."! On the
other hand, it would be an anomalous position if recovery for the damaged
property had to depend on whether the component part was a replacement
or was bought separately from the 'basic product.' This provision may
also be interpreted to cover damage caused by containers, packages or
pipe in which products are supplied and distributed. The Act further
requires that the. person suffering the loss must have an interest in the
damaged property." However this requirement may not be so relevant
since the ambit of liability under the Act is already regulated by the
requirement that the person proves that he has suffered damage."
DEFENCES
It is a matter of policy that product liability law should maintain a
fair, just and proper balance between the interest of the consumer and
the interest of the producer. It may be impossible, and perhaps undesirable,
that this objective can be achieved if an absolute liability is imposed on
the producer whereby he cannot exonerate himself in any circumstances.
On the other hand, legislation is likely to have little effect if the right of a
producer to be protected by certain defences outweighs the interest of
the aggrieved consumers whom the law is intended to protect."
Nevertheless section 72(1) of the Act provides five specific defences in
product liability claims." The burden of proof is on the person proceeded
against to establish that either of the following defences applies to him;
3. It should be noted that under the law of negligence damage within a defective product,
that is caused by the component part, may fit into the category of physical damage to
other property and therefore be recoverable. See e.g MS Aswan Engineering
Establishment Co. Ltd. v Lupdine Ltd. [1987] I All ER 135.
39 Section 69(2X3)
40 G. Howells, supra, n. 6, at 48.
41 Obviously the availability of certain defences may reduce or intrude upon the
compensation rights of the injured persons and thus their existence, particularly the
development risks defence, under the UK Act has been subjected to a considerable
degree of criticism. See A. Clark, supra, n. 4, Chapter 6; G. Howells, supra, n. 22, at
39-40; C. Newdick "The Development Risk Defence of the Consumer Protection
1987," (1988) CU 455; S. Whittaker "The BEC Directive on Product Liability,"
(1985) 5 Yearbook of European Law 233; J. Stapleton, supra, n. 27, at 392.
42 General defences under the tort of negligence such as volenti non fit injuria and
contributory negligence may also be raised by the defendant.
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(a) Compliance with mandatory regulations;
(b) Producers <lidnot supply the product;
(d) The defect did not exist in the product at the relevant time;
(e) The development risks defence;
(f) The component manufacturer's defence.
The producer may escape liability ifhe can prove that 'the defect
is attributable to compliance with any requirement imposed under any
written law.' However this defence will only be available ifthe defendant
had no choice in the matter because he was under a legal obligation to
comply. The defence would apply iffor example, a regulation specifies
that a certain additive must be used in a certain food and that additive
causes a defect in the food. Accordingly, compliance with a voluntary
code of practice or relevant standard adopted by industry or trade
associations or testing houses, forexample SIRIM, may not be enough."
On the other hand, it will be strong evidence that the state of the art or
the state of scientific and technical knowledge has been complied with.
In practice the defence seems to have a very limited application,
and is probably confined to those cases where the legal requirement is
itself inadequate because it is misconceived or outdated. Even in such a
case the difficulty may still arise in establishing a direct causal link between
the mandatory regulation and the defect. Thus, if a regulation for children's
nightwear specifies that it must be made of non- flammable material, but
the garment causes dermatitis, the producer could only escape liability if
the irritant was an inevitable result of the process of making the material
non-flammable. However, if there are other factors which contribute to
that effect, the defence may not be available.
It may be argued that the term 'any written law' in the defence
refers to statutory provisions or delegated legislation of the Malaysian
parliament only. Therefore, compliance with the regulations of other
countries is not covered by the defence in respect of products distributed
in Malaysia. This is particularly relevant with regard to imported goods
and thus the importer must make sure that they comply with local
regulations. It should be noted that most regulations only impose minimum
standards, such as minimum strengths or maximum heats and other ranges
of specifications within which the product must comply. The defence
appears to apply only if, taking this discretion into account, it is still
impossible to produce a safe product. Obviously, if a majority of
manufacturers of a type of product provide a level of safety well above
4J It is notable however that under Rule 22 of the Electricity Supply Regulations 1990,
all electrical appliances must be sent to the SIRIM for testing and certification before
they are distributed for sale.
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that demanded by the legal minimum, this defence cannot be relied upon
by the defendant. It may also be argued that if the product complies with
the mandatory standard and is not safe, the manufacturer should not
market it, and this should not provide him with a defence. In other words
the onus to market a safe product should always remain with the
manufacturer."
The Act also provides a defence that the defendant 'did not at
any time supply the defective product to another person.' The key word
in this defence is the word 'supply', which is defined in section 3 to
include the selling, hiring, exchanging and leasing of the goods. This defence
is clearly intended to exclude a person who is not responsible for a product
being on the market. Thus, it would apply where thieves steal the products
from the producer and supply them to the consumer. It will also cover all
injuries to employees or others caused by a product during the
manufacturing or packaging, occurring on the employer's premises, since
the products were not yet supplied." However if the injury was caused
by the defective component part, the employees may claim compensation
under the Act against the component manufacturer.
However promotional gifts and free samples are not included within
the definition of 'supply' and the producer therefore can rely on this
defence. Similarly the defence may exempt most products on trial, although
they may have left the manufacturer's premises and therefore have been
'supplied' in a strict sense, for example where the products have been
sent to a scientific or other institute to carry out tests. Therefore, a
bystander who is injured by a trial product, for example, when a defective
car crashes on a test drive may not be able to claim against the producer.
Although the theory of this defence seems straightforward, a
defendant may face difficulties of proof in practice. It may not be enough
for him to say that he did not supply the product, and that someone else
did. This is particularly important with regard to counterfeit products which
are widely marketed in Malaysia. Difficulties arise when the imitated or
counterfeited products cannot be distinguished from the original products.
Although generally the producer of original products cannot be said to be
the producer, own-brander or importer of counterfeit products and thus is
prima facie not liable, it may still be necessary for him to ensure that his
44 In any event, if a producer consciously manufactures a dangerous product, he may be
liable in negligence notwithstanding compliance with regulations. See the judgement of
Megaw L.J in Albery and Budden v BP Oil Ltd. and Shell UK Ltd., The Times, 9 May
1980 and reproduced in part in J. Miller and B. Harvey, Consumer and Trading Law
Cases and Materials, (London, 1985), at 156.
45 It .should be noted that the injured employees may claim remedies under other
legislation, such as the Factory and Machinery Act 1967.
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own products are distinguishable, whether by obvious or clandestine
means. Where the product itself no longer exists, for example when it is
totally destroyed in the explosion, this defence would be almost impossible
to establish.
It is the defendant who has to establish this defence and the
victim of a defective product will benefit if the former fails to do so.
However, if the defence is successfully established, the victim will be left
uncompensated. It is not possible for the plaintiff to sue the supplier or
importer, let alone the manufacturer, because any person involved in
counterfeiting products will be subjected to criminal charge" and in many
cases they are not capable of being traced. Thus, as long as Malaysia
does not have strong protection for intellectual property rights, neither a
producer of an original product nor a victim of a counterfeited product
would be fully protected or benefit from a new product liability law.
The producer may be further exonerated from liability ifhe can
prove 'that the defect did not exist in the product at the relevant time.'
'Relevant time' refers generally to the time the product was supplied."
It is reasonably clear that the producer is only liable for defects which
occurred during the course of production. This defence, which may be
the most important defence in practice, protects the producer where the
defect is due to mishandling, poor fitting, servicing, transporting, adjusting
or faulty installation or repair. It will also cover the defect which is caused
by the failure of a third party to pass on instructions for use or warnings;
or where the third party has removed a warning label.
It will not however provide a defence against latent defects which
are not known or manifest, for these defects would have been in existence
at the time of the product was put into circulation. In fact it may not be
easy in practice for the producer to establish that the product was not
defective when it left his hands. It may not be enough for him to say that
the wear and tear caused the defect because a product can be defective
if it is not reasonably durable. Thus the producer ought to have quality
control evidence of the state of his product on release. In order to rely
46 See the Patent Act 1983 and the Copyright Act 1987. Despite the existence of these
legislation, piracy and counterfeiting are rampant in Malaysia. This is mainly due to
poor enforcement. See S. Reiss, "International Copyright Protection: The State of the
Malaysian Laws in Perspective," (1986) Journal of Malaysian and Comparative Laws
107 and Workmens' Compensation Act 1952.
47 However, relevant time in relation to electricity means the time at which it was
generated, being a time before it was transmitted or distributed. See section 72(2)(a).
In other words, the Act only covers defects due to the process of generation of
electricity for instance, the supply of excessive voltage of electricity to a domestic
consumer but not damage caused by disruption in the supply through breakdown in
the distribution system or damage resulting from a failure to supply.
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successfully on the defence, it may also be important for a producer to
keep detailed records on the design and manufacturing process as well
as records of instructions, warnings, service schedules, recommendations,
and use-by dates which were issued with the product."
By virtue of section 72( 1)(e), the component manufacturer may
not be liable for the defect in the end-product ifhe can prove;
"that the defect -
(i) is a defect in a product in which the product in
question is comprised therein ("the subsequent
product"); and
(ii) is wholly attributable to-
(a) the design of the subsequent product;
(b) compliance by the producer of the product
in question with instructions given by the
producer of the subsequent product."
This defence is clearly in line with the basic rule of product liability
law whereby the liability will only be imposed if the product is defective.
Thus, the component manufacturer who produced a product which was
originally not defective cannot be considered responsible for the
subsequent defect in the product when it has been comprised in the final
product due to the design or process of manufacturing of the latter. In
other words, the component product is not defective in the first place.
Thus, a component manufacturer of nuts and bolts is not liable for an
accident caused by the shearing of the bolt if the producer of the finished
product had subjected it to a stress that it was not designed to bear. He
may also argue that the bolt which failed was made that way as specified
by the manufacturer of the finished product.
However to succeed on the first part of the defence, the
component manufacturer must show that there would have been no defect
or failure in his product if the subsequent product had been properly
designed and manufactured. He may need to carry out exhaustive testing
on a finished product in order to establish this fact. The component
manufacturer may still be liable jointly with the finished product
manufacturer if it can be proved that the component partly contributed to
the failure. It may be even more difficult to establish that the defect was
wholly attributable to compliance with instructions given by the producer
of the subsequent product. The component manufacturer who has some
involvements in design decisions, for example collaborative research and
41 Wright, supra, n. 18, at 61.
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development, may not be able to plead this defence." Thus, it may still
be important for the component manufacturer to supply with his products
full product specifications and warnings and be particularly aware of the
uses to which his product is put.
THE DEVELOPMENT RISKS DEFENCE
Section 72(l)(d) of the Act allows the person proceeded against a
defence if he can show that:
"the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the
relevant time was not such that a producer of products
of the same description as the product in question may
reasonably be expected to discover the defect if it had
existed in his product while it was under his control."
This is known as the "development risks defence" which is
sometimes used interchangeably with the 'state of the art defence.'
However, a more tenable view is that these terminologies represent
separate concepts as far as the Act is concerned. As Clark writes;
" ... [t]he term state of the art could be used to connote a
product which is not defective when judged against the
prevailing safety standards at the time when it was put
into circulation; in contrast, the term development risks
is used in situations in which the product is defective
when put into circulation, but the manufacturer has the
defence that existing knowledge made the defect not
reasonably discoverable. Thus, state of the art arguments
relate to the questions of defectiveness, while
development risks issues arise later, as a defence to a
finding of defectiveness.'?"
Thus, a product manufactured ten years ago without special safety
devices, such as a child-prooftop on a bottle or a child-central lock on a
49 Wright, supra, n. 18, at 66.
so A. Clark, supra, n. 4, at 151. See also Taschner, "European Initiatives: The European
Communities" in C.J.MilIer, Comparative Product Liability, (London, 1986), at I. It
is noticeable that 'state of the art defence' is a standard term used in the American
product liability law despite the suggestion that it ought to be abandoned since 'its
meanings are so diverse and so often confused.' See Wade, "The Effect in Products
Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing," (1983) 58 NYUL Rev. 734 at
751.
196 IIUM LAW JOURNAL
microwave oven, cannot be considered to be defective since it complied
with the state of art, in terms of reasonably expected safety, at the time it
was put into circulation. On the other hand, if a drug, for example whooping
cough vaccine, is found to cause brain damage; then it may be considered
to be defective at the moment it was put into circulation. However, it may
be open to the producer to argue that the causal connection between the
vaccine and the disease was not scientifically discoverable at the time
the product was put into circulation, and that is the development risks
defence.
In theory the defence has no place in strict product liability in
which liability will be determined by judging the product and not the
reasonableness of the producer's conduct." Thus whether the producer
did not know or could not have known about the defect is irrelevant. It
may be argued on behalf of consumers that the introduction of strict
product liability without the development risks defence is one way to
prevent Malaysia from being a dumping place for unwanted goods
imported from developed nations. Obviously most Malaysians are not
willing to see their country become a testing ground for untried products.
The availability of the defence may be seen as providing manufacturers
or importers with an unnecessary protective shield for marketing defective
products, for which liability would otherwise be imposed.
However, there would appear to be a number of practical and
policy considerations which support the availability of the defence under
the Malaysian product liability law." In the first place it would be unjust
to impose liability on the producer who would be powerless to avoid liability
since the defects were not capable of being discovered at the time of
production. It is generally known that there are risks in new products that
cannot be foreseen however careful the producer is, and that these are
inevitable risks which the public must accept in the face of technological
advances as the country heads further into an era of industrialisation.
Undoubtedly society is more advanced and even safer as a result of
technological development.
Malaysia is still in the process of developing its own advanced
technology by encouraging research and development in any possible
area. Thus the imposition ofliability without the development risks defence
may discourage innovation in manufacturing industry and even perhaps
51 The defence is clearly recognised in the tort of negligence. See Roe vMinister of Health
(1954) 2 QB 66; Vacwell Engineering Co. Ltd. v B.D.H Chemicals Ltd. [1971] 1QB
88; Independent Broadcasting Authority v EM! Electronics Ltd. and BICC Construction
Ltd. [1980] 14 BLR 1 Thompson v Smiths Shiprepairers (North Shields) Ltd. [1984]
1All ER 881.
51 It is notable that the defence has been included in the UK law and the majority of Ee
countries.
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stifle research. The defence would be of particular importance to high-
technology industries such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals and aerospace
which the country may develop in the future. Those industries are highly
likely to contain unknown hazards and have always been subjected to
continuous technological improvements. It is reasonably clear therefore
that the consumer interest in having new products put on the market at
acceptable prices has to be balanced against the consumer interest in
seeing that the victims of defective products receive compensation for
their injuries.
The defence is only applied to cases of unknown and
undiscoverable risks of defect in a product and it ceases to be available
after the date at which the existence of the defect could have been
discovered. However, the Act introduces the less demanding concept of
expectancy which is more close to negligence principles. As the wording
"may reasonably be expected" clearly imports an element of
reasonableness. The Act, therefore, covers the risks of defects which
are absolutely undiscoverable" as well as reasonably undiscoverable. 54
The reference to "a producer of products of the same description" may
be seen as introducing an element of subjectivity into the defence. On the
other hand it will provide courts with an ascertainable standard against
which the producer should be judged." However, difficulty may arise
where there is no other 'producer of products of the same description as
the product in question.' A problem also arises over the application of the
defence to 'other defendants' who are not the manufacturer and not
involved in any research activities. On what standard should they be
judged? Does the same standard apply to a small-scale business and a
giant company? In fact, many questions remain unanswered since the
proper meaning of the defence itself is not clear. 56 It may be anticipated,
however, that the defence will be of limited application in practice and
may only be raised by the defendant in very exceptional circumstances.
53 It is a risk which only becomes apparent as a new product is used and causes injury,
for e.g. the adverse side effects of a drug which only affect the user's offspring and
later generation.
54 Reasonably undiscoverable risks may include a risk which can only be discovered by
extraordinary means, for example the unexpected reaction when chemicals interact
with one another, which could only be discovered if all technical tests which are
expensive and time - consuming were used, or all literature on the subject in the world
were consulted.
55 Newdick, "The Development Risk Defence of the Consumer Protection Act 1987,"
(1988) CLl 456.
56 Ibid. See also A. Clark, supra, n. 4 chapter 6, 1. Stapleton, Product Liability,
(Butterworth, London, 1994), chapter 10.
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CONCLUSION
The introduction of a new system ofliability for injury caused by
a defective product into the law of Malaysia through Part X of the
Consumer Protection Act 1999 is undoubtedly a major legislative reform
in the field of consumer protection generally, and product liability in
particular. The Act may be perceived as having made it easier for plaintiffs
to prove their cases, as they no longer have to prove fault by the
manufacturer. Since the new law focuses more on the actual performance
and condition of the product than on the manufacturer's care, it may be
easier for the plaintiff to assemble sufficient evidence of defect than
when trying to prove negligence. Undoubtedly, therefore, the Act has
made a significant change in concept. However, whether this change in
concept can be translated into a corresponding change in practice is
questionable.
The Act obviously does not remove all barriers to successful
product liability claims. There, in fact, remains ample scope for argument
over whether a product as designed and marketed is 'defective' and
over issues of causation and available defences. Furthermore, being a
statutory scheme covering a major area such as product liability, the Act
has to define its own boundaries of application. This is done by a new set
of concepts, such as 'product', 'producer' and 'defect'. Each of these
concepts, however, carries with it uncertainties and ambiguities which
are capable of being resolved only after litigation. Thus, until case law is
built up, no one can be sure whether the Act can really achieve its main
objective to provide better protection to the consumer. Despite the
shortcomings in the Act there are, arguably, numerous occasions in which
the Act will be of use to the victims of injuries caused by defective
products. The real effect of the new law, therefore, is yet to be seen.
